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This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that 
political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre–
electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist. Agreements that fully eliminate 
it exist when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. 
These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts parties and an 
output–expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, 
regulatory agencies with some degree of political independence are needed to implement pre–
electoral agreements. 
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This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk, which a recent
survey on strategic business risk proclaimed in 2008 as “the greatest strategic challenge
facing leading global businesses”.1 It demonstrates in a two–party system with party–speciﬁc
political preferences that electoral uncertainty generates such risk, but political parties have
incentives to eliminate or at least reduce it by committing to pre–electoral agreements.
In particular, at least one of the two parties is averse to regulatory risk in the classical
sense of mean preserving spreads. The other party’s risk preferences depend on a trade–oﬀ
between a negative ﬂuctuation and a positive output–expansion eﬀect of regulatory risk.
The negative eﬀect dominates when the party’s odds of winning are unfavorable or when
diﬀerences between the parties are relatively small. In this case, both political parties prefer
implementing the expected regulatory objective with certainty over waiting for the uncertain
election outcome. Under eﬃcient bargaining, one may expect that parties eliminate political
uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk with pre–electoral agreements.
When political divergences are large and wining probabilities are appropriately skewed,
there do not exist mutually beneﬁcial agreements that eliminate regulatory risk. In this
case, however, parties still have a strict incentive to reduce regulatory risk by at least some
degree. In particular, there always exist mutually beneﬁcial agreements that implement a
regulatory schedule which still depends on the election outcome, but for which the implied
degree of regulatory risk is smaller than the original one.
These results suggest that, with political bargaining, politically motivated regulatory risk
is less problematic than seems at ﬁrst sight. A potential time–inconsistency problem may,
however, undermine this optimistic view and turn political bargaining into an ineﬀective
institution for implementing mutual beneﬁcial reductions of regulatory risk. This is so, be-
cause even though both political parties have, from an ex ante point of view, an incentive
to agree on a mutually beneﬁcial agreement, a party has no incentive to implement it after
winning the election. When parties anticipate such ex post myopic behavior, pre–electoral
1The Ernst&Young 2008 survey on strategic business risk conﬁrms the importance of regulatory risk.
Already a EUI survey from 2005 revealed that risk managers view regulatory risk as the most important
risk.
2agreements are not credible and unable to achieve the mutually beneﬁcial outcome. Fol-
lowing the literature on delegation, I argue that parties can circumvent this commitment
problem by institutionalizing a politically independent regulatory agency and endowing it
with the objective to regulate according to the pre–electoral agreement. My theory, there-
fore, provides a ﬁrst formal rationale for the prevalence of politically independent regulatory
agencies.2 Moreover, mutually beneﬁcial agreements may require that the regulatory out-
come still depends on the election outcome. Political parties can implement such conditional
pre–electoral agreements by granting regulatory agencies limited political independence. For
instance, the parties may limit the broad objectives of the regulatory agency, but give the
winning party control over its exact budget or the nomination of the agency’s chairman.
Hence, the puzzling observation that in some countries the delegation to independent reg-
ulatory agencies is only partial may actually be seen as part of an optimal institutional
arrangement to reduce regulatory risk.
I derive my results in the standard regulation framework of Baron and Myerson (1982),
where a government tries to regulate a privately informed monopolist with the objective to
maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts.3 I embed this framework in a
political economy model, where two political parties run for election before regulating the
ﬁrm. Both parties are benevolent but diﬀer in their views about the appropriate relative
weights between the consumers’ and producers’ surplus. These diﬀerent political views cause
a preference for diﬀerent regulatory policies and, thereby, generate regulatory risk. In order
to evaluate the parties’ incentives for reducing this risk, I compare their expected payoﬀs
with regulatory risk to their payoﬀs under diﬀerent pre–electoral agreements.
The analysis reveals, ﬁrst of all, that a party’s attitude towards regulatory risk is fully
determined by a ﬂuctuation and an output–expansion eﬀect. The ﬂuctuation eﬀect hurts
both parties unambiguously, whereas the expansion eﬀect beneﬁts one party, while it hurts
the other. As a result, at least one party unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk, whilst the
other party likes regulatory risk only when the expansion eﬀect outweighs the ﬂuctuation
eﬀect. I show that the ﬂuctuation eﬀect dominates when the degree of political divergence
2E.g., OECD (2002) reports that independent regulatory agencies are currently “one of the most
widespread institutions of modern regulatory governance”.
3See Armstrong and Sappington (2008) for an introduction to optimal regulation models.
3is small or the winning probability of the party that beneﬁts from the expansion eﬀect is
large. In this case, pre–electoral agreements exist that lead to a full elimination of regulatory
risk. I, moreover, characterize the set of pre–electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk
and yield larger expected payoﬀs for both parties. This characterization shows that this set
is always non–empty so that there always exist mutually beneﬁcial agreements that reduce
regulatory risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the related
literature. Section 3 sets up the framework in which I analyze the paper’s research questions.
In Section 4, I characterize optimal regulation and its comparative statics. Section 5 studies
how electoral uncertainty induces regulatory risk and how the diﬀerent political parties
evaluate this risk. Section 6 then analyzes the potential of pre–electoral agreements to
reduce regulatory risk. Section 7 identiﬁes a time–inconsistency problem in implementing
pre–electoral agreements and discusses delegation as a way to circumvent it. The paper
closes in Section 8 with a short discussion of the diﬀerent policy implications of my results.
For those propositions that do not follow directly from the text, formal proofs are collected
in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on regulatory risk is small. Chang and Thompson (1989) analyze
regulatory risk under rate of return regulation. Panteghini and Scarpa (2008) study the
eﬀect of regulatory risk on investment by comparing price–caps to proﬁt–sharing rules. Both
these papers compare ad–hoc regulation schemes rather than studying regulatory risk under
optimal regulation. In contrast, Strausz (2009) develops a tractable analytical framework to
study regulatory risk in optimal monopoly regulation under asymmetric information. The
current paper uses a speciﬁc version of this framework.4
Although an extensive literature investigates the multi–faceted connections between po-
litical economy and regulation, the literature has not addressed the speciﬁc relation between
4A part of the literature models increases in regulatory risk as direct increases in the probability of
expropriation or tougher regulation rather than only pure changes in risk in the sense of mean preserving
spreads (e.g., Armstrong and Vickers 1996).
4political economy and regulatory risk. Closest related is Laﬀont (2000), who analyzes the
welfare trade–oﬀs between an inﬂexible, constitutionally ﬁxed regulatory schedule and a
ﬂexible schedule that reacts to changes in the marginal cost of public funds but underlies
political capture by two diﬀerent consumer groups. In contrast to the current paper, Laf-
font’s framework is not cast in terms of regulatory risk.5 A further diﬀerence is that my
paper presents a positive rather than a normative analysis.
The literature on political economy is well aware of the beneﬁts of delegation due to com-
mitment problems. My contribution to this literature is to combine two standard approaches,
time–inconsistent behavior and electoral uncertainty, in a novel way. To explain this in more
detail, it is helpful to clarify ﬁrst that the literature on political economy eﬀectively considers
two fundamentally diﬀerent commitment problems. First, there is the time–inconsistency of
Kydland and Prescott (1977), which shows that a decision maker is hurt when he cannot
commit to its future, short run decisions. The problem here is a lack of self–commitment.
Without self–commitment, the decision maker beneﬁts from delegating future decisions to
a third party in order to bind himself.6 Note that in this literature electoral uncertainty
actually reduces the relevance of the commitment problem, because it increases the chance
that today’s holder of public authority is diﬀerent from tomorrow’s holder of authority.
In contrast, the strand of the literature that explicitly connects delegation with political
uncertainty concentrates on a fundamentally diﬀerent commitment problem: The inability
of current holders of public authority (e.g., current voters or elected politicians) to constrain
the decisions of future holders of public authority. An extensive literature studies the impli-
cations of this commitment problem (e.g., Glazer 1989, Persson and Svensson 1989, Alesina
and Tabellini 1988, 1990; Tabellini and Alesina 1990). For this literature, the problem is not
one of self–commitment but one of “other–commitment”. Moe (1990, p.229), for example,
argues that political uncertainty induces current public authority holders to use delegation
as “protective devices for insulating agencies from political enemies”. Vogel (1996, p.131)
applies this view directly to regulation when he observes that “Thatcher administration oﬃ-
5Strausz (2009) shows that stochastic changes in the marginal cost of public funds also generate regulatory
risk.
6A prominent example in the context of monetary policy is the argument in favor of central bank inde-
pendence (Rogoﬀ 1985).
5cials favored independent regulators because of the dynamics of alternance in British politics.
The party in power wants to be able to inﬁltrate the bureaucracy, but by the same token
wants to guard it from future inﬁltration by the other party.”
Because I consider a self–commitment problem which is only relevant with electoral un-
certainty, my paper links commitment problems with electoral uncertainty in a novel way.7
In other words, my paper shares with the literature on time–inconsistency that delegation
circumvents a self–commitment problem. A crucial diﬀerence is, however, that in my frame-
work the self–commitment problem is unproblematic without political uncertainty. With
the literature on electoral uncertainty, it shares the view that electoral uncertainty causes
a commitment problem, but the role of delegation is not to commit future public authority
holders.
3 The Setup
Consider the seminal Baron and Myerson (1982) setup of a monopolistic ﬁrm that produces
a publicly provided good x at a constant marginal cost. There are no ﬁxed costs. Given
marginal costs c, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt from producing a quantity x for a lump–sum transfer t is
Π(t,x|c) ≡ t − cx.
Marginal costs are cl with probability ν and ch with probability 1−ν, where ∆c ≡ ch−cl > 0.
The ﬁrm, however, is perfectly informed about its marginal costs c.
When consumers pay a lump–sum transfer t in exchange for the consumption of a quantity
x, they obtain the consumer surplus
Ψ(t,x) ≡ v(x) − t.
The term v(x) expresses the consumers’ overall utility from the consumption of a quantity x
of the good. I follow the standard assumption that consumer’s marginal utility of the good
x is positive but decreasing, i.e., v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. Moreover, I assume that v′′′ exists, but
7Gilardi (2005a) examines the explanatory power of the two diﬀerent types of commitment problems for
the political independence of regulatory agencies.
6make no assumptions about its sign. Because v′ represents the consumers’ (inverse) aggre-
gate demand function, the third derivative v′′′ determines the curvature of the consumers’
aggregate demand function.8 As a consequence, the demand function is convex exactly when
v′′′ is non–negative. The regulatory framework is a special version of Strausz (2009), which
provides the general insight that the curvature of the demand function plays a crucial role
in how regulatory risk aﬀects regulatory outcomes.
Before regulation takes place, there is a general election between a party l and a party
r. The election determines the ruling party that runs the government and, ultimately,
decides about the regulation. I assume that the election exhibits some randomness which,
for simplicity, I take as exogenous: Party r wins the election with probability α ∈ (0,1) and
party l wins it with probability 1 − α.9 After the election, the winning party’s task is to
regulate the monopolistic ﬁrm.
I assume that both parties are benevolent in that they maximize an objective function
W that is a weighted sum of the consumer surplus and the ﬁrm’s proﬁts:
W = Ψ + λpΠ, (1)
where the parameter λp ∈ [0,1) represents the weight which party p attaches to proﬁts.
The only diﬀerence between the two parties is that λl  = λr. One interpretation is that the
two parties diﬀer in their perception of the appropriate weight λ in society’s social choice
function or cater to the preferences of heterogeneous voter groups. Without loss of generality,
I assume that the party r has a more business friendly orientation so that ∆λ ≡ λr −λl > 0.
In particular, a ﬁrm that receives a transfer t and produces a quantity x at marginal costs
8The consumer’s demand x(p) solves maxx v(x) − px and satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition v′(x(p)) =
p. By the implicit function theorem, diﬀerentiating twice and rearranging terms yields x′′(p) =
−v′′′(x(p))x′(p)2/v′′(x(p)). Due to v′′ < 0, the sign of v′′′ fully determines the curvature of demand.
9In principle, α could be determined by a more elaborate political economy model. The crucial assumption
is that there is at least some uncertainty about the election outcome so that α ∈ (0,1). This obtains, for
instance, when the preferences of the electorate exhibit some randomness, when the outcome of the elections
depend on other uncertain political issues than the regulatory problem alone, or when voting is costly so
that voters, in equilibrium, use mixed strategies for whether to vote. Essentially, the model takes seriously
that elections in real life always have at least some degree of uncertainty.
7ci yields party p ∈ {l,r} a payoﬀ of
Wp(x,t,ci) ≡ Ψ(x,t) + λpΠ(x,t) = v(x) − λpcix + (1 − λp)t.
To summarize, the triple (α,λl,λr) describes the political system. For a given political
system, I deﬁne ∆λ ≡ λr − λl as the measure of political divergence of the system.
4 Optimal Regulation
In this section, I calculate the optimal regulatory schedule for a given objective function
W. From the revelation principle, it follows that the optimal regulation contract is a direct
mechanism (tl,xl,th,xh) that gives the ﬁrm an incentive to report its true cost type ci.




νWp(xl,tl,cl) + (1 − ν)Wp(xh,th,ch) (2)
s.t. th − chxh ≥ tl − chxl and tl − clxl ≥ th − clxh (3)
tl ≥ clxl and th ≥ chxh, (4)
where (3) represents the incentive compatibility conditions that ensure truthtelling and (4)
represents the ﬁrm’s participation constraints and reﬂect the implicit assumption that both
types of ﬁrm are required to operate.
As is well known, only the incentive compatibility of the eﬃcient ﬁrm cl and the individual
rationality constraint of the ineﬃcient ﬁrm ch are binding. Solving for these two constraints
yields the transfers th = chxh and tl = clxl + ∆cxh. Substituting out the transfers, problem
P simpliﬁes to maximizing the expression
˜ Wp(xl,xh) ≡ ν[v(xl) − clxl − (1 − λp)∆cxh] + (1 − ν)[v(xh) − chxh]
with respect to the quantities xl and xh.
The ﬁrst order conditions that characterize the optimal quantity schedules (ˆ xl, ˆ xh) are
v
′(ˆ xl) = cl and v
′(ˆ xh) = ch + (1 − λ)ψ∆c, (5)
8where ψ ≡ ν/(1 − ν). Hence, we obtain the standard result that the allocation of the
eﬃcient type coincides with the ﬁrst best and the allocation of the ineﬃcient type is distorted
downwards. Consequently, only the output ˆ xh depends on the parameter λ.
The optimal regulatory schedule for a given proﬁt–weight λ yields party p the payoﬀ
ˆ Wp(λ) ≡ ˜ Wp(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λ)).
The following lemma conﬁrms the intuitive but helpful property that ˆ Wp attains a maximum
at λp.
Lemma 1 The function ˆ Wp is increasing for λ < λp and decreasing for λ > λp. It attains
a unique maximum at λp so that ˆ W ′
p(λp) = 0 and ˆ W ′′
p (λp) < 0.








Due to v′′ < 0, the derivative ˆ x′
h(λ) is positive and, therefore, ˆ xh(λl) ≤ ˆ xh(λr) ≤ x
fb
h . This
illustrates the intuitive result that the more business friendly party r asks the ﬁrm to produce
more. The explanation is that more production leads, due to higher information rent, to
higher proﬁts, which party r discounts less than party l.










The expression shows that the sign of ˆ x′′
h(λ) coincides with the sign of v′′′. Because v′′′
represents the curvature of the consumer’s demand function, the schedule ˆ xh(λ) is convex
when the consumer’s demand is convex. If the demand function is concave, then the schedule
ˆ x(λ) is concave. Hence, if we compare the allocation ˆ x(λe) at the expected
λe ≡ αλr + (1 − α)λl
with the expected output under regulatory risk
ˆ x
e
h ≡ αˆ xh(λr) + (1 − α)ˆ xh(λl),
9then, with convex demand, ˆ xe
h ≥ ˆ x(λe). This means that regulatory risk has a positive
expansion eﬀect on output when demand is convex. For concave demand, we have ˆ xe
h ≤ ˆ x(λe)
so that the expansion eﬀect of regulatory risk is negative. Strausz (2009) shows that the one–
to–one relationship between the sign of the expansion eﬀect and the curvature of demand
holds more generally and is not particular to the binary character of asymmetric information.
5 Incentives for Reducing Regulatory Risk
Electoral uncertainty implies that the high cost ﬁrm will produce output ˆ xh(λr) with prob-
ability α and the output ˆ xh(λl) with probability 1 − α. Hence, uncertain elections generate
uncertain regulation outcomes and, therefore, regulatory risk. In this section, I ask how this
regulatory risk impacts the political parties and whether they have incentives to reduce or
even eliminate it. I study these questions, ﬁrst, from the perspective of classical risk analysis
and, second, from a more general bargaining perspective.
The ﬁrst approach rests on the observation that the risky election outcome that the ﬁrm
will be regulated under the parameter λr with probability α and λl with probability 1−α is a
mean preserving spread of the deterministic expected outcome λe in the sense of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970). Hence, in line with classical risk analysis I say that a political party
dislikes regulatory risk when its expected payoﬀ with the risk is smaller than its payoﬀ under
the expected policy:
ˆ Wp(λe) ≥ W
e
p(α) ≡ α ˆ Wp(λr) + (1 − α) ˆ Wp(λl). (8)
In contrast, a party likes regulatory risk when the inequality is reversed. From classical risk
analysis it then follows that the curvature of ˆ Wp determines party p’s attitude towards risk.
In particular, party p dislikes regulatory risk, when its payoﬀ ˆ Wp is concave in λ. In contrast,
the political party likes the risk, when its payoﬀ function ˆ Wp is convex. The following lemma
establishes a suﬃcient condition under which a party’s payoﬀ ˆ Wp is concave around λ.
Lemma 2 The function ˆ Wp(λ) is concave around λ when
(λp − λ)ψ∆cv
′′′(ˆ xh(λ)) < [v
′′(ˆ xh(λ))]
2. (9)
10When the local condition (9) holds globally, the function ˆ Wp(λ) is concave globally,
which implies that party p dislikes regulatory risk in general. Because the expected policy
preference λe lies in between λl and λr, the relevant interval for considering the curvature
of ˆ Wp(λ) is [λl,λr] rather than the overall domain [0,1]. For λ ∈ [λl,λr], all the signs of the
diﬀerent terms in (9) are unambiguously determined except for v′′′. We, therefore, obtain
the following insights about the parties’ risk preferences.
Proposition 1 When demand is globally concave (v′′′ < 0), party r dislikes regulatory risk.
When demand is globally convex (v′′′ > 0), party l dislikes regulatory risk. For linear demand
(v′′′ = 0), both parties dislike regulatory risk.
Proposition 1 gives a deﬁnite answer about risk preferences for demand functions that
are either globally convex or globally concave. It is, however, uninformative about risk
preferences for demand curves with a changing sign of curvature. For such demand functions,
the local eﬀect of regulatory risk can change over the relevant domain [λl,λr] and we have
to consider the overall global eﬀect of regulatory risk directly. For this reason, the following
proposition extends the previous one. It shows that, independent of the demand curve, at
least one political party dislikes regulatory risk.
Proposition 2 In any political system (α,λl,λr) there exists at least one political party
that dislikes regulatory risk. If the expansion eﬀect is positive (ˆ xe
h ≥ ˆ xh(λe)), then party l
dislikes regulatory risk. If the expansion eﬀect is negative (ˆ xe
h ≤ ˆ xh(λe)), then party r dislikes
regulatory risk.
In order to understand the intuition behind Proposition 1 and 2, it is helpful to de-
compose the overall eﬀect of regulatory risk in an expansion eﬀect and a ﬂuctuation eﬀect.
The previous section introduced the expansion eﬀect of regulatory risk and showed how the
curvature of the demand function determines its sign. To understand the ﬂuctuation eﬀect
of regulatory risk, consider ﬁrst the case where there is no expansion eﬀect: ˆ xe
h = ˆ xh(λe).
In this case, regulatory risk has only a ﬂuctuation eﬀect in that, with regulatory risk, out-
put ﬂuctuates between ˆ xh(λl) and ˆ xh(λr), whereas without regulatory risk it is ﬁxed at its
expected value ˆ xh(λe) = xe
h. Because of the consumers’ decreasing marginal utility, the two
parties dislike such ﬂuctuations. This explains the statement of Proposition 1 that, with lin-
11Concave demand v′′′ < 0
λl λr ˜ λ
l likes risk l dislikes risk
ˆ Wl(λ)
ˆ Wr(λ)





r likes risk r dislikes risk
Figure 1: Non–concave payoﬀ functions
ear demand, both parties dislike regulatory risk, because, as shown in the previous section,
the expansion eﬀect is zero when demand is linear.
When the expansion eﬀect is positive, regulatory risk has the additional eﬀect that it
raises the expected value of the output itself. In this case, regulatory risk moves the expected
allocation ˆ xe
h further from party l’s ideal output ˆ xh(λl). This hurts party l. Given that also
the ﬂuctuation eﬀect is negative, the two eﬀects reinforce each other and, therefore, party
l unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk. This explains not only the second statement of
Proposition 2, but also the second statement in Proposition 1, because a convex demand
implies that the expansion eﬀect is positive. In contrast, the positive expansion eﬀect has a
positive eﬀect on party r, because it moves the expected output ˆ xe
h closer to its ideal value
ˆ xh(λr). Hence, from party r’s perspective, a positive output expansion eﬀect counteracts the
ﬂuctuation eﬀect. If the former is strong enough, party r actually likes regulatory risk.
The opposite logic holds when the expansion eﬀect is negative so that output contracts.
In this case, party r unambiguously dislikes regulatory risk, because it is hurt by both the
ﬂuctuation and expansion eﬀect. For party l, however, the contraction in output is beneﬁcial.
If it is strong enough to outweigh the ﬂuctuation eﬀect, it induces party l to like regulatory
risk. A suﬃcient condition for the expansion eﬀect to be positive is a convex demand.
Figure 1 illustrates the role of curvature further. When demand is concave (v′′′ < 0),
condition (9) is, due to the output contraction eﬀect, satisﬁed for any λ < λp. This implies
12that the curve ˆ Wp is concave for all weights λ that are smaller than the party’s ideal weight
λp. As illustrated in the ﬁrst graph of Figure 1, this implies for party r that its payoﬀ
function ˆ Wr is concave for the entire range [λl,λr]. For λ > λp, a party p beneﬁts from the
output contraction eﬀect and, for λ large enough, condition (9) is violated. As illustrated in
the ﬁrst graph of Figure 1, this implies that there exist a range of [˜ λ,λr] such that party l
beneﬁts from regulatory risk. For convex demand, regulatory risk has an output expansion
eﬀect that hurts a party p for λ > λp and beneﬁts it for λ < λp. As a result, the curve
ˆ Wp is concave for any λ > λp but not necessarily for λ < λp. Consequently, party l dislikes
regulatory risk for any expected weight λe, whereas party r may like regulatory risk.
Proposition 2 reveals that at least one political party dislikes regulatory risk, but Figure
1 illustrates that the other party may or may not like it. I next characterize political systems
in which both parties dislike regulatory risk. I deﬁne such systems as political systems that
are averse to regulatory risk.
Because the curve ˆ Wp(λ) reaches, by deﬁnition, its maximum at λp, it is necessarily
concave at λp. Hence, a party’s objective function ˆ Wp(λ) is concave for weights λ close
to the party’s ideal weight λp. This reasoning suggests that a party’s payoﬀ tends to be
concave over the whole range [λl,λr] when this range is small. Hence, the degree of political
divergence, ∆λ, seems to play an important role in determining the risk attitude of political
systems. To make the connection between risk attitudes and the political divergence more
precise, deﬁne10





This deﬁnition leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 A political system (α,λl,λr) is averse to regulatory risk whenever political
divergence ∆λ is small and, in particular, smaller than ¯ λ.
According to Proposition 2 at least one party dislikes the regulatory risk. When we
denote this party as the regulatory risk averse party, it follows that the other party dislikes
regulatory risk when the winning probability of this party is not too large. This leads to the
following result.
10If v′′′(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, ˆ xh(1)], then ¯ λ = ∞.
13Proposition 4 A political system (α,λl,λr) is averse to regulatory risk whenever the win-
ning probability of the regulatory risk averse party is small enough.
The proposition shows that a suﬃcient condition for a political system to be regulatory
risk averse is that the party that is not regulatory risk averse is likely enough to win. This
implies that a necessary condition for this party to like regulatory risk is that it is relatively
unlikely to win the election. At ﬁrst sight this may seem surprising, but Figure 1 illustrates
the intuition behind the result. When the party that may potentially prefer regulatory risk
is likely to win, its payoﬀ function is necessarily concave around the expected value λe.
Therefore, also this party has a tendency to dislike regulatory risk.
6 Pre–electoral Agreements
When the political system is averse to regulatory risk, it has an interest in eliminating
it. One way of doing so is to institutionalize a procedure of pre–electoral bargaining which
allows political parties to agree on future regulation before the election takes place. In
political systems that are averse to regulatory risk, eﬃcient pre–electoral bargaining leads
to an elimination of regulatory risk, because the political parties themselves strictly beneﬁt
from regulating the ﬁrm on the basis of the expected regulatory variable λe rather than
waiting for the uncertain election outcome. General pre–electoral bargaining procedures
may, however, also allow and lead to agreements on other regulatory variables than the
expectation λe. In this section, I characterize the conditions under which mutual beneﬁcial
agreements exist that reduce regulatory risk. I, thereby, distinguish between two types of
agreements: unconditional and conditional ones.
I ﬁrst concentrate on pre–electoral bargaining over agreements on a single regulatory
variable λb. Such agreements eliminate regulatory risk completely, because they lead to a
deterministic regulatory schedule despite the electoral uncertainty. In particular, the agree-
ment does not condition the regulatory rule on the ﬁnal election outcome. I, therefore, call
such agreements unconditional. Restricting attention to unconditional agreements, I fully
characterize the set of unconditional agreements λb from which both parties beneﬁt.
A party p beneﬁts from agreeing to some regulatory variable λb if it yields party p at
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Figure 2: Mutual beneﬁcial unconditional pre–electoral agreements Λ(α)
least the same payoﬀ as its expected status quo payoﬀ W e
p. Hence, let λp(α) ∈ [λl,λr] satisfy
the relation
ˆ Wp(λp(α)) = W
e
p.
Because ˆ Wp is monotone on the interval [λl,λr] and W e
p lies in between ˆ Wp(λl) and ˆ Wp(λr),
the value λp(α) exists and is unique. Moreover, party l strictly prefers regulation on the
basis of any λ < λl(α) to the regulatory risk outcome, because ˆ Wl is decreasing on [λl,λr].
Similarly, party r strictly prefers regulation on the basis of any λ > λr(α) to the regulatory
risk outcome. Hence, if λr(α) < λl(α) then for any λ ∈ (λr(α),λl(α)) both parties prefer it
to the regulatory risk outcome. This reasoning leads to the following result.
Proposition 5 In a political system (α,λl,λr) there exist mutually beneﬁcial, unconditional
pre–electoral agreements if and only if λr(α) < λl(α). In this case, any λb ∈ Λ(α) is beneﬁcial
with
Λ(α) ≡ (λr(α),λl(α)).
The ﬁrst graph in Figure 2 illustrates the construction of Λ(α) in the case where both
parties dislike regulatory risk. The second graph illustrates the case where one party actually
likes regulatory risk. In both cases, λr(α) > λl(α) so that a non–empty set of beneﬁcial
15regulatory variables exists. Yet, if λr(α) > λl(α) then there does not exist a mutual beneﬁcial
λ.
For a political system that is averse to regulatory risk, we have, as illustrated in the ﬁrst
graph of Figure 2, λe ∈ Λ(α). Hence, in such political systems the set Λ(α) is non–empty
and, in general, not a singleton. Proposition 5 shows moreover that the parties also beneﬁt
from regulating on the basis from other regulatory variables than the expected value λe.
A common dislike of regulatory risk is, therefore, a suﬃcient condition for the existence of
beneﬁcial pre–electoral agreements, but not a necessary one. The second graph of Figure 2
illustrates that beneﬁcial pre–electoral agreements may exist even if regulating on the basis
of the expected value λe is not mutually beneﬁcial.
Clearly, within the set Λ(α), the two parties have diverging preferences. In particular,
party l prefers values close to λr(α) whereas party r prefers values close to λl(α). It then
depends on the relative bargaining strengths and the speciﬁc bargaining procedure which
λ ∈ Λ(α) the parties will agree on.
Until now I restricted attention to agreements on a single regulatory variable λb. In
particular, parties were unable to bargain over agreements that implement a diﬀerent reg-
ulatory variable for diﬀerent election outcomes. In this subsection, I study the potential
beneﬁts of conditional agreements (λb
l,λb
r) which implement the regulatory variable λb
p ex-
actly when party p wins the election. An unconditional agreement λb is a special, trivial
case of a conditional agreement with λb
l = λb
r = λb.
When parties agree explicitly on a conditional agreement with λb
l  = λb
r, then this agree-
ment does not eliminate regulatory risk completely. I will say that a conditional agreement
(λb
l,λb
r) reduces regulatory risk whenever λl < λb
l ≤ λb
r < λr. The expected payoﬀ of party
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Figure 3: Mutually beneﬁcial, conditional pre–electoral agreements Λc
With this deﬁnition I demonstrate the following result.
Proposition 6 For any political system, there always exist mutually beneﬁcial, conditional
agreements (λb
l,λb
r) that reduce regulatory risk. More precisely, Λc  = ∅ and any (λb
l,λb
r) ∈ Λc
is a mutually beneﬁcial, conditional agreement that reduces regulatory risk.
Figure 3 demonstrates the intuition behind the proposition by drawing the party’s indif-
ference curves, Il and Ir, associated with the risky allocation (λl,λr) for the range λb
l,λb
r ∈






(1 − α) ˆ W ′
p(λb
l)













it follows that both indiﬀerence curves are falling for this range and have the slope −(1−α)/α
at λb
l = λb
r, where there is no longer any regulatory risk. The ﬁrst graph illustrates the case
where both parties dislike regulatory risk. In this case, the indiﬀerence curves of party l
is concave, whereas the indiﬀerence curves of party r is convex. These curvatures imply
λr(α) < λl(α). As a result and illustrated by the two–sided arrows, any agreement on the
45–degree line with λb ∈ (λr(α),λl(α)) is a mutually beneﬁcial agreement that eliminates
regulatory risk completely. Hence, in the ﬁrst graph of Figure 3, the set Λ(α) is non–empty.
The second graph illustrates the case where there do not exist mutually beneﬁcial agreements
17that eliminate regulatory risk completely. It shows that on the 45-degree line there are no
allocations (λb,λb) that both parties prefer to the risky allocation (λl,λr). As depicted,
λl(α) exceeds λr(α) so that Λ(α) is empty. The shaded area illustrates, however, that there
still exist conditional agreements from which both parties beneﬁt. These agreements all lie
oﬀ the 45–degree line and therefore still imply regulatory risk, but the implied degree of
regulatory risk is less than under the original allocation (λl,λr), because the allocations lie
closer to the 45–degree line.
To see that the shaded area (and, therefore, a non–empty set Λc) always exists, the slope
of the two indiﬀerence curves in (λl,λr) are crucial. From the marginal rate of substitution
(11), it follows that the indiﬀerence curves of party l have a zero slope whenever λb
l = λl,
whereas the indiﬀerence curves of party r has an inﬁnite, negative slope for λb
l = λr. Hence,
the indiﬀerence curve Ir is always steeper than the indiﬀerence curve Il. This implies that
we can always ﬁnd a non–empty shaded area Λc.
7 Commitment Problems
If both parties dislike regulatory risk, each gains from regulating the ﬁrm on the basis of
some common deterministic policy variable λb ∈ Λ(α) rather than waiting for the uncertain
election outcome. Moreover, even if one party likes regulatory risk, then, according to
Proposition 6, there still exist mutually beneﬁcial agreements that reduce regulatory risk.
Under eﬃcient bargaining, one may, therefore, expect the political parties to reduce or even
eliminate regulatory risk completely.
A problem is, however, that, after the election, the winning party p has an incentive to
implement a regulatory schedule that is based on its preferred policy variable λp. Hence,
even though parties beneﬁt from agreements before the election, the winning party has no
longer an incentive to abide by it after the election; it would break any agreement to bring
regulation fully in line with its political preferences. Such ex post changes undermine the
pre–electoral agreement and make them non–credible. The political system, therefore, faces
a commitment problem that hinders the implementation of mutual beneﬁcial agreements.
18Economic literature points to two institutional arrangements for overcoming commitment
problems: commitment sustained by delegation or by repeated interaction. Political parties
may circumvent the time–inconsistency problem by creating a politically independent insti-
tution and give it the responsibility to regulate the ﬁrm on the basis of some policy variable.
The parties can implement an unconditional agreement by writing into the by–laws of the
regulatory agency the exact objective function by which the agency is to regulate. Condi-
tional agreements can be implemented with by–laws that stipulate only a broad objective,
whose details are left under the control of the government.11
The idea of delegation squares well with regulatory governance in practise. For instance,
an OECD 2002 report notes that independent regulatory agencies are currently “one of the
most widespread institutions of modern regulatory governance”. The commitment problem
which I identiﬁed provides an explanation for this observation. Moreover, the eﬀective in-
dependence of many regulatory agencies is often incomplete and somewhat limited.12 For
instance, governments can inﬂuence the behavior of regulatory agencies by selecting a diﬀer-
ent director or changing its budget. In the light of my results, this imperfect delegation may
actually be seen as a way of implementing conditional agreements rather than unconditional
ones. The explanation is also consistent with the observation that regulatory agencies tend
to be more independent in countries where there is frequent turnover between governments
with diﬀerent preferences (Gilardi 2005a, p.141 and Gilardi 2005b).
A second approach to overcome commitment problems is cooperation by repeated in-
teraction. It is well known that the eﬀectiveness of repeated interactions depend crucial
on the available punishment strategies towards non–cooperating parties. Intuitively, these
punishment serve as a threat that keeps players from deviating from cooperative agreements
and the harsher the available punishments, the stronger the potential for such cooperation.
To apply these ideas to my model, it is, therefore, crucial to know how political parties can
11To implement a concrete conditional agreement (λb
l,λb
r) in our theoretical framework, parties may,
before the election, institutionalize an independent regulatory agency with rules that allows only regulation
for λ ∈ (λb
l,λb
r). The winner of the election is, then, allowed to select the actual λ within this set. In this
case, party r would select λb
r after winning the election, whereas party l would select λb
l. Hence, this scheme
implements the conditional agreement (λb
l,λb
r).
12Gilardi (2004) measures the degree of independence for diﬀerent regulatory agencies in diﬀerent countries.
19discipline potential deviators from violating agreements.13 A proper analysis should, in par-
ticular, include all possible ways that political parties can punish each other. Because such
an analysis goes beyond the narrow setup I consider here, I can only but note that repeated
interaction may alleviate the commitment problem. Note however that the two solutions
towards the commitment problem should be seen as complements rather than mutually ex-
clusive substitutes. If it is harder to change policies when they are delegated, it is also easier
to achieve cooperation by repeated interactions with delegation than without delegation.
8 Conclusion and Discussion
Recent business surveys make strong claims that regulatory risk poses a major threat to
modern economies. This paper shows that one obvious cause of regulatory risk, politi-
cal uncertainty, actually generates less regulatory risk than one may initially suspect. It
demonstrates in particular that political parties have a natural tendency to reduce and even
eliminate it. Political parties face, however, a commitment problem that undermines their
attempts to reduce regulatory risk. This provides a rationale for the prevalence of inde-
pendent regulatory agencies in practise. These institutions can be understood as a way to
reduce the regulatory risk problem by third party delegation.
The formal analysis identiﬁes the two driving forces that determine the attitude of po-
litical parties towards regulatory risk: a ﬂuctuation and an output–expansion eﬀect. The
ﬂuctuation eﬀect hurts both parties, whereas exactly one party beneﬁts from the output–
expansion eﬀect. When the negative ﬂuctuation eﬀect dominates, regulatory risk hurts both
parties. This is the case when the political divergence between the two parties is not too
large or when the winning probability of the party who beneﬁts from the output–expansion
eﬀect is large enough. In this case, political parties have an incentive to eliminate regulatory
risk completely.
Because the paper identiﬁes the two driving forces that determine attitudes towards
regulatory risk, its results also imply that parties have no incentive to increase regulatory
13See De Figueiredo (2002) for a formal analysis of cooperation by repeated interactions in a political
economy model with electoral uncertainty.
20risk artiﬁcially. Hence, even if independent regulatory agencies are created for diﬀerent
reasons than for a lack of commitment, political parties still have an incentive to endow the
agency with robust and stable objective functions that reduce rather than increase regulatory
risk.
I considered a setup where political parties are unable to use direct side payments to
facilitate bargaining. If one allows such side payments then eﬃcient bargaining leads to
a regulation on the basis of a regulatory variable λ∗
lr that maximizes the common surplus
ˆ Wlr(λ) ≡ ˆ Wl(λ) + ˆ Wh(λ). It is straightforward to see that the common surplus function
is equivalent to twice the surplus function ˆ Wp(λ) that obtains from an individual party p
with the weight λp = (λl + λr)/2. It is then immediate that λ∗
lr = (λl + λr)/2. Therefore,
also with side payments political parties have an incentive to eliminate the regulatory risk
that political uncertainty generates. The result is even stronger, because it is independent
of whether the common surplus function Wlr(λ) is concave or convex. It follows because,
by Lemma 1, the common surplus function has a unique maximum. Yet, in the context of
political economy, the assumption of eﬃcient side payments seems inappropriate. For this
reason the analysis concentrated on the case without transferable utility.
Appendix










From (5) it follows
v
′′(ˆ xh)∂ˆ xh/∂λ = −ψ∆c
so that, due to v′′ < 0, we have ∂ˆ xh/∂λ > 0. The sign of ˆ W ′
p(λ), therefore, coincides with
the sign of ∂ ˜ Wp/∂xh(ˆ xh). Note that
∂ ˜ Wp
∂xh
(ˆ xh) = −ν(1−λp)∆c+(1−ν)(v
′(ˆ xh)−ch) = −ν(1−λp)∆c+(1−ν)(ψ∆c) = (λp−λ)∆c.
Hence, ∂ ˜ Wp/∂xh(ˆ xh) and, therefore, ˆ W ′
p is positive for λ < λp and negative for λ > λp. This
shows that ˆ Wp(λ) is increasing for λ < λp and decreasing for λ > λp. Consequently, ˆ Wp
21attains a unique maximum at λp. Because ˆ Wp is twice diﬀerentiable it holds ˆ W ′
p(λp) = 0
and ˆ W ′′
p (λp) < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The function ˆ Wp(λ) is concave around λ if ˆ Wp(λ) is concave with
respect to some interval [λ,λ] around λ. A suﬃcient condition for this is that ˆ W ′′
p (λ) < 0.
We have
ˆ Wp(λ) = ν[v(ˆ xl) − clˆ xl − (1 − λp)∆cˆ xh(λ)] + (1 − ν)[v(ˆ xh(λ)) − chˆ xh(λ)].
Using (5), diﬀerentiation of Wp(.) yields
ˆ W
′
p(λ) = −ν(1 − λp)∆cˆ x
′
h(λ) + (1 − ν)[v
′(ˆ xh(λ)) − ch]ˆ x
′
h(λ)
= −ν(1 − λp)∆cˆ x
′
h(λ) + (1 − ν)(1 − λ)ψ∆cˆ x
′
h(λ).
Using the deﬁnition of ψ, (6), and (7), a further diﬀerentiation of Wp(.) yields
ˆ W
′′
p (λ) = [−ν(1 − λp)∆cˆ x
′′
h(λ) + (1 − ν)(1 − λ)ψ∆cˆ x
′′
h(λ)] − (1 − ν)ψ∆cˆ x
′
h(λ)
= (λp − λ)ν∆cˆ x
′′
h(λ) − (1 − ν)ψ∆cˆ x
′
h(λ)












Hence, ˆ W ′′
p (λ) < 0 exactly when
(λp − λ)ψ∆cv




Proof of Proposition 1: For the special case where demand is convex (v′′′ > 0) it follows,
for any λ ∈ (λl,λr), that (λl−λ)ψ∆cv′′′(x) < 0 < (v′′(x))2. Hence, inequality (9) is satisﬁed
so that ˆ Wl(λ) is concave and, therefore, ˜ W e
l is smaller than ˆ Wl(αλr + (1 − α)λl) for any
α ∈ (0,1).
For the special case where demand is concave (v′′′ < 0), it follows, for any λ ∈ (λl,λr),
that (λr − λ)ψ∆cv′′′(x) < 0 < (v′′(x))2. Hence, inequality (9) is satisﬁed so that ˆ Wr(λ) is
concave and, therefore, ˜ W e
r is smaller than ˆ Wr(αλr + (1 − α)λl) for any α ∈ (0,1).
For the linear demand case (v′′′ = 0), we have ˆ xe
h = ˆ xh(λe). I showed that, for this case,
both party r and party l dislike regulatory risk. Q.E.D.
22Proof of Proposition 2: I ﬁrst prove the second part of the Proposition. It follows
W
e
r − ˆ Wr(λe) = α ˆ Wr(λr) + (1 − α) ˆ Wr(λl) − ˆ Wr(λe)
= α ˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λr)) + (1 − α) ˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λl)) − ˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λe))
=
h






˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ x
e
h) − ˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λe))
i





˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ x
e
h) − ˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λe))
i
.
Due to v′′ < 0, the ﬁrst term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square
brackets is non–positive, because ˆ xe
h ≤ xh(λe) < ˆ xh(λr) and ∂ ˜ Wr/∂xh > 0 for xh < xh(λr)
imply ˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ xe
h) ≤ ˜ Wr(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λe). As a result the overall expression is negative and, there-
fore, party r dislikes regulatory risk.
Similarly for party l, it follows
W
e





˜ Wl(ˆ xl, ˆ x
e
h) − ˜ Wl(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λe))
i
.
Due to v′′ < 0, the ﬁrst term in squared brackets is negative. The second term in square
brackets is non–positive, because ˆ xe
h ≥ xh(λe) > ˆ xh(λl) and ∂ ˜ Wl/∂xh < 0 for xh < xh(λl)
imply ˜ Wl(ˆ xl, ˆ xe
h) ≤ ˜ Wl(ˆ xl, ˆ xh(λe). As a result the overall expression is negative and, therefore,
party l dislikes regulatory risk.
Hence, if party l likes regulatory risk then, necessarily, ˆ xe
h < ˆ xh(λe), but party r then
dislikes regulatory risk. Similarly, if party r likes regulatory risk then ˆ xe
h > ˆ xh(λe), but party
l then dislikes regulatory risk. Hence, we cannot have that both parties like regulatory risk
and if some party likes risk then the other party dislikes it. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We show that for ∆λ < ¯ λ condition (9) is satisﬁed for any
λ ∈ (λl,λr) so that ˆ Wp(λ) is concave for the whole interval [λl,λr].
Consider ﬁrst party r: For any α ∈ (0,1), it follows
(λr − λe)ψ∆cv
′′′(ˆ xh(λe)) = (1 − α)∆λψ∆cv
′′′(ˆ xh(λ)) ≤ (1 − α)∆λψ∆c|v
′′′(ˆ xh(λ))| ≤
∆λψ∆c|v





′′′(ˆ xh(λ))| = v
′′(ˆ xh(λ)))
2.
23A similar result holds for party l: For any α ∈ (0,1), it follows 0 < λl < λe < λr < 1 and
therefore
(λl − λe)ψ∆cv
′′′(ˆ xh(λe)) = −α∆λψ∆cv
′′′(ˆ xh(λ)) ≤ |α∆λψ∆cv
′′′(ˆ xh(λ))| =
α∆λψ∆c|v







′′′(ˆ xh(λ))| = v
′′(ˆ xh(λ)))
2.
Hence, for ∆λ < ¯ λ both ˆ Wl(λ) and ˆ Wr(λ) are concave over the interval [λl,λr]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, suppose party l is a regulatory risk averse party. Be-
cause Wr(λr) > Wr(λl), the expression W e
r(α) is strictly decreasing in α and, in particular,
W e
r

























because ˆ W ′
r(λr) = 0. Because ˆ Wr(λe(1)) = W e
r(1), it then follows that ˆ Wr(λe(α)) > W e
r(α)
for α < 1 but close enough to 1.
If party l is not a regulatory risk averse party, then, by Proposition 2, party r is regulatory
risk averse. By a similar argument, one can then show that d ˆ Wl(λe(0))/dα = 0. Because
W e
l (α) is strictly increasing in α, it then follows that ˆ Wl(λe(α)) > W e
l (α) for α > 0 but close
enough to 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Lemma 1 shows that ˆ Wl is decreasing on [λl,λr]. Hence, ˆ Wl(λ) >
ˆ Wl(λl(α)) = W e
l if and only if λ < λl(α). Similarly, ˆ Wr(λ) > ˆ Wr(λr(α)) = W e
r if and only if
λ > λr(α), because ˆ Wr is increasing on [λl,λr]. Hence, ˆ Wl(λ) > W e
l and ˆ Wr(λ) > W e
r if and
only if λ ∈ Λ(α). Therefore, pre–electoral agreement is potentially beneﬁcial if and only if
Λ(α) is not empty which is equivalent to λr(α) < λl(α). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Consider the pair (λb
l(ε),λb
r(ε)) ≡ (λl + ε,λr − ε) with ε > 0.











r(0) = −α ˆ W
′
r(λr) + (1 − α) ˆ W
′
r(λl) = (1 − α) ˆ W
′
r(λl) > 0,
24because ˆ W ′
r(λr) = 0 and ˆ W ′
r(λ) > 0 for λ < λr. Moreover,
V
′
l (0) = −α ˆ W
′
l(λr) + (1 − α) ˆ W
′
l(λl) = −α ˆ W
′
l(λr) > 0,
because ˆ W ′
l(λl) = 0 and ˆ W ′
l(λ) < 0 for λ > λl. Hence, for a small enough ε > 0, we have
W b
p(γ(ε)) > W e
p for both p ∈ {l,r} and λl < λb
l(ε) < λb
r(ε) < λr so that (λb
l(ε),λb
r(ε)) ∈ Λc
and, therefore, Λc  = ∅. Q.E.D.
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